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Christians are called not just to ethical living but to a distinctive ethics. Anthony Bash persuasively 
argues that remorse is fundamental to Christian ethics although frequently overlooked by Christian 
ethicists. 
From the viewpoint of classical ethics, the virtuous person would not act unethically, and if 
they did the main concern was the inconsistency between their actions and their character rather 
than the people wronged. A communitarian ethics discouraged apology because this reduced a 
person’s standing in the eyes of their peers. In the Old Testament, in contrast, people were 
accountable for their misdeeds, which if intentional could not be expiated by sacrifice. The clearest 
example of a remorseful person there is Saul, on recognizing his error in attempting to kill David (1 
Sam. 26.21). David is himself sometimes cited as another, but his recognition that he sinned against 
the Lord (2 Sam. 12.13, Ps. 51.4), rather than against Bathsheba, Uriah or Joab, falls short of the 
interpersonal remorse that Bash seeks. Not until the New Testament does classical emotion combine 
with biblical accountability to produce remorse. Judas displays this on realizing the irreversibility of 
his betrayal of Jesus (Mt. 27.3), as does Peter, following his ensuing disavowal of Jesus (Mk 14.72), 
and Paul (1 Cor. 15.9, Eph. 3.8), who remains ashamed of his former persecution of Christians. 
Probably drawing on this experience, Paul writes of a Corinthian offender feeling remorse (lype) and 
describes the entire community feeling this after hearing his letter read (2 Cor. 2.7, 7.8-11). 
In later Christian history, Bash contends, remorse recedes. A penance could expiate a sin, 
even if performed by a person other than the sinner, who might pay a monastery for prayers or buy 
indulgences to remit sins and time in purgatory. In any case, whether in Aquinas, German pietism or 
Scots Presbyterianism, offences were viewed as being against God and the moral order rather than 
against neighbour. Bash identifies the same tendency in current Roman Catholic and Church of 
England confessional practices. In the book’s second half, he therefore engages secular moral 
philosophy and psychology, especially where these are concerned with emotion, to try to correct 
this deficiency. Nevertheless, in a robust chapter on punishment he argues that, in a criminal justice 
context, remorse should not reduce punishment because this would undermine justice, diminish the 
deterrent effect of punishment and the impulse for self-reform, and provide an opportunity for 
manipulation by insincere expressions of remorse. The material in this half of the book, although 
well researched and presented, may be of less interest to readers in theology and Christian ethics. 
Bash makes a strong case for remorse but because this depends on appraisals of 
consequences it is complicated in practice, as shown by Paul’s own vacillation (2 Cor. 7.8). I might 
feel remorse for an action soon after performing it but recognize later that it was morally neutral or 
even morally required. People may present themselves as wronged to manipulate others, gain moral 
power or fend off moral challenge to themselves. For reasons such as these, there may be more in 
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